The paper focuses on one of the topics of key concern for both indigenous peoples and the mining se namely the corporate responsibility to respect indigenous peoples' right to give or withhold their con to extractive industry projects in their lands and the fundamental role of this principle in altering predominant and all too frequently devastating model of mining that is imposed in indigenous peo territories. The paper traces the emergence of extractive industry standards and initiatives showing continuing mining disasters and associated human rights abuse have obliged the industry to recog indigenous peoples' right to give or withhold their Free, Prior and Informed Consent to operations may affect their customary lands. It examinesthe development of industry good practice since the W Bank's Extractive Industries Review, the subsequent formation of the International Council on Min and Metals while considering the contribution its members have played in recent mining catastro involving indigenous peoples. It distills good practice on indigenous consultation and the princip native title from evolving national and international lawand tracks how these have led to the inclusi Free, Prior andInformed Consentin the recentInitiative for Responsible Mining Assuranceand Alumin StewardshipInitiative standards. The focus on the two most recent multi-stakeholder standard initia in the mining sector offers a sense for where further developments may occur while also noting potentiallimitations. The paper concludes with recommendations to theextractive industry to recog and protect indigenous' peoples' rights as a preeminent principle of responsible mining good practi
Introduction
Ever since Cristobal Colon's first visit to the Americas the quest for gold has been a major driver of colonial and post-colonial States' take-over of indigenous peoples' lands (Columbus, 1969) . It was the lure of gold that led to the decimation of the Arawaks of Hispaniola (Rouse, 1992) , to Cortes' destruction of the Aztec Empire (Diaz, 1963; Thomas, 2003) , and Pizarro's subjugation of the Inca (Hemming, 1970) . The gold mines of Ashanti led Portuguese explorers to sail round the west coast of Africa (Ley, 2000) and later brought British imperial rule to the area (Robinson et al., 1965) . Gold brought speculators onto indigenous lands in California leading to the near elimination of the indigenous peoples there (Kroeber, 1961) and later to shatter the Tlingit during the Klondyke gold rush (Wilkinson, 2005) . Famously too it was gold mining that led to the annexation of the Black Hills, sacred to the Lakota ( ) Sioux (Debo, 1970) . These are but some of the most well-known ex ples of early mining disasters from indigenous peoples' poin view (Moody, 1988; Cocker, 1999) .
All these invasions of indigenous peoples' lands occurred trary to early agreed principles of international law; that na peoples' are endowed with the same rights as other humans (Do 2015a) and their lands should not be taken without their con (Colchester and MacKay, 2004; Doyle, 2015a) . Nascent inte tional law, while ostensibly recognizing that native peoples inherent rights over their land and to govern themselves, ertheless provided a series of justifications for infringement those rights, which when combined with deceit, subterfuge the legally sanctioned (or otherwise) use of force, served to dep indigenous peoples of those basic rights.
Since the 1970s,indigenous peoples have been active as a gl movement insisting on their rights -equal to other peoples self-determination, to ownership and control of their lands, ritories and resources and to 'Free, Prior and Informed Cons (FPIC) . Of all industrial sectors, it has been the extractive indust those involved in natural resource extraction (such as oil, me http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pecon.2017.05.007 1679-0073/© 2017 Associação Brasileira deCiência Ecológica e Conservação. Published by Elsevier Editora Ltda. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND lic ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/). minerals and aggregates) and its related processes (ranging from exploration to selling to end consumers) that have been most resistant to acknowledging these rights. Although within the logging, palm oil, and to a lesser extent the sugar sector a subset of actors, since the 1990s, recognized these rights in good practice standards (Colchester and Chao, 2014) , even though the effectiveness of these standards remains questionable, the extractive industries has only reluctantly and belatedly accepted this consensus. This despite the fact that United Nations agencies, including the International Fund for Agricultural Development -the first international financial institution to adopt FPIC as an operational standard (IFAD, 2009 ) -the United Nations Development Programme and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, all require or encourage adherence to FPIC in activities that they plan, finance or implement (World Bank, 2003a) .
While the focus of the paper is on the emergence of FPIC as the standard with which companies must comply, it does not attempt to engage with the content of FPIC or with the diversity of community perspectives that must inform its implementation. It should also be noted though this paper addresses extractive industries in the broader sense, the primary focus of this paper shall be on the mining sector as this has been to date the most proactive of the extractive sector arms in acknowledging indigenous peoples' rights. 1
Early initiatives, including Extractive Industries Review
Extractive industry led initiatives have tended to generate more suspicion than harmony. The first notable initiative was the Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development Project (MMSD), a research initiative promoted by the industry's Global Mining Initiative (GMI) from 2000 to 2002 to review how the sector could contribute to a global transition to sustainable development, tied into the World Summit on Sustainable Development (MMSD, 2002) . While the MMSD clearly had limitations from the perspective of indigenous peoples -and of course constituted an attempt by the industry to rebrand itself as "sustainable" -its "Breaking New Ground" report was relatively progressive, when compared to the establishment of the International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM) and its initial position statements. The MMSD +10 report summarized the original MMSD position as "Government should recognize and uphold the rights of indigenous people and companies should act 'as in to gain consent'. Indigenous people need an international body to establish and uphold good practice, and evidence of good practice engagement between mining companies and indigenous people" (Buxton, 2012) . Onecould argue that the MMSD report was the initial step towards acknowledging the relevance of FPIC and the need to ensure respect for indigenous peoples' rights.
Nevertheless, the project was widely criticized for being nothing more than a public relations exercise directed at improving the poor image of mining, rather than offering improvements in on site practice. The lack of meaningful participation from any indigenous representation perpetuated the industry's history of unilateral initiatives and its self-declared and "self-regulated" codes of conduct (Tauli-Corpuz and Kennedy, 2002) . Furthermore, the major source of all funding for the project was unsurprisingly the industry, which provided $7 million (Caruso et al., 2003) .
Whilst most civil society groups and indigenous organizations rejected the MMSD and its commitments, the World Bank uncritically accepted its legitimacy, acting as one of the few non-industry sponsors of the project (Caruso et al., 2003 (World Bank, 2003b) and crucia right to give or withhold their FPIC (MacKay, 2004) .
The World Bank rejected many of the EIR's findings, inc that FPIC should be the principal determinant of whether t community acceptance, and failed to incorporate sufficien guards to the subsequent revision to its policy on indi peoples' (OP 4.10) in 2005. Instead it created a standard o Prior Informed Consultation' resulting in 'Broad Communit port' (BCS), a standard widely rejected by indigenous peo inconsistent with their human rights. A similar standard pre used by the World Bank's private sector lending arm, the In tional Finance Corporation (IFC), of 'good faith negotiation' to BCS, was removed following a review of BCS which demonstrated the standard is almost impossible to use effe as a tool to establish certainty of support for a given project 2008). Subsequently, the new IFC Performance Standard 7 a in 2012 required FPIC for certain categories of projects re the reality that FPIC applies irrespective of national legislati should be triggered by any project which may effectively indigenous peoples' rights (UN General Assembly, 2010). T FPIC standard is now adopted by a number of lending insti as a condition of loans to the private sector and has pla important role in establishing FPIC as the requirement to by the industry and financial actors although effective imp tation and verification of compliance with this IFC FPIC st remain lacking 5 years after its adoption by the IFC. It is es however, that its implementation be consistent with indi peoples' rights and be flexible enough to cater to local realit the indigenous conception of FPIC.
The public sector arms of the World Bank (IBRD and ID tinue to apply standards and guidance which have largely to result in the sort of effective participation that the Ban seeks to ensure (OPCS, 2011) , isolating and underminin ditional authorities, damaging indigenous peoples' cohesi and alienating them from decision-making. New standard ing into force from January 2018 will require FPIC under project conditions, a welcome step, but have removed key pl requirements, which may serve to undermine the new inclu FPIC. A further development of serious concern is the World recent approvals for a series of projects in East Africa, inc two in Tanzania (Chavkin and Ulman, 2016) where the Ba approved government requests to waive the indigenous p policy. This has sparked real fears that the development is setting an unfortunate precedent for future practices, re protections for indigenous peoples' rights, particularly in Responsibility is therefore increasingly passing to the ext industry toapply industry-focused standards emerging from stakeholder initiatives that safeguard indigenous peoples' r
The International Council on Mining and Metals: policy a practice
In May 2001, building on the work of the MMSD, th created the ICMM, to focus on industry implementation of s able development. One of the main objectives of the ICM to develop a policy for its members, which became opera May 2003. The ten principles in the code are phrased in tional terms, with heavy emphasis on "intent" on the part member companies to improve their performance, but were initially devoid of specific requirements for compliance (Sethi and Emelianova, 2006) . For example, the third principle states its goal is to "uphold fundamental human rights and respect cultures, customs and values" yet it did not fully embrace FPIC as a right of indigenous peoples. This initial policy offered little effective protection to mine-affected communities and failed to provide a minimal level of performance specific social practices to which all industry members were expected to adhere. Reference to indigenous peoples' is scant at best, the text instead endorses the notion of consent through the ambiguous language of "constructive dialogue", "respect for communities" and "serious engagement with them" (ICMM, 2002) without committing its members to carry out concrete community engagement procedures.
ICMM's subsequent 2008 'position statement' on mining and indigenous peoples attempted to set a high standard for interactions between mining companies and indigenous peoples, one of cooperation, understanding and respect. The position statement cautioned companies not to rely too heavily on national governments to protect indigenous communities and encouraged companies to point out gaps in implementation of international instruments and standards governments had agreed or ratified. It requested members to consult with communities from "the earliest possible stage of potential mining activities, prior to substantive on-the-ground exploration" (ICMM, 2008) through to closure and recommended projects to avoid, or at the very least minimalize adverse impacts as well as make special arrangements to protect indigenous sites of cultural or spiritual importance. Yet crucially, it did not acknowledge indigenous community's right to say no to a mining project, a right embodied in the FPIC standard instead endorsing the lesser standard of BCS for new projects (ICMM, 2010) . The 2013 position statement made progress on amending this. Although it does not overtly recognize indigenous peoples' rights to say no, it talks of companies working towards FPIC, noting that "states may also play an important role in supporting. . .companies in the pursuit of FPIC" (ICMM, 2013) . These obligations, although not ensuring all council members would obtain consent, set the expectation that indigenous peoples would receive a place at the negotiating table. Interestingly, none of the ICMM position statements refer to the legacy of past mining operations and the need for this to be addressed in order for indigenous peoples' rights to be respected; this tends to be a major blind spot of current good practice.
Unfortunately, it is easy to provide examples of where ICMM members have fallen short of aspired policies, particularly regarding human rights violations. Barrick Gold -the world's largest gold producer -expanded their mining operations into Mount Tenabo and Horse Canyon in Nevada, USA, areas with deep cultural and religious significance for the Western Shoshone peoples, despite local resistance. The UN's Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) issued Early Warning and Urgent Action decision 1(68) in (UN Committee Elimination Racial Discrimination, 2006 , calling upon the United States to "freeze" and "desist" all activities conducted on ancestral lands without consultation with the Western Shoshone peoples. In 2008 the CERD reiterated its decision and the Shoshone peoples sought a preliminary injunction to stop the destruction of their sacred sites (IEN, 2010) . Despite the judge acknowledging that the project will desecrate the mountain and decrease the community member's spiritual fulfilment from their religion the injunction was rejected on the grounds that the significant financial costs of the injunction outweighed these religious factors (South Fork Band v. US Department of Interior, 2009a). These financial costs could have been avoided had the community been initially consulted and given the opportunity to show their unwillingness to consent to exploitation. Later injunctions were successful (South Fork Band v. US Department of Interior, 2009b) only for them to be li in 2012. Although many of these events happened prior to ICMM's policy creation, Barrick continues to operate in the causing irreparable damage to Western Shoshone lands, threa ing both the health of its people and the survival of their cul (Cavanaugh-Bill and Howard, 2012) .
In Guyana, colonial domination and institutionalized rac prevail and are firmly entrenched in Guyanese law and poli something that mining companies such as ICMM member N mont have profited from (Colchester and La Rose, 2010) . Min concessions and exploration permits have been superimposed ancestral lands to the extent that they now cover two-thirds o country (Colchester and La Rose, 2010) while the local Amerind hold title to less than half of their traditional territories (Weitz 2011). All this has occurred without the FPIC of Guyana's ind nous peoples. The often ignored social and economic consequen include denial of access to traditional farming grounds; damag hunting and fishing grounds; and the sexual exploitation of ind nous women (Atkinson et al., 2016) .
Similar threats exist in Colombia, a country with a histor armed conflict fuelled by extractive activities (Weitzner, 20 where AngloGold Ashanti (AGA), an ICMM member, has m ing rights to 7.5% of the State's territory. In 2008 AGA sta exploration activities in the Cañamomo Lomaprieta Indigen Reserve without the consent on the peoples who occupy the (RICL, 2008) . This violation happened despite the ICMM's p tion (Weitzner, 2012) illustrating that voluntary corporate so responsibility initiatives on their own are far from sufficien uphold human rights on the ground, particularly in the con of armed conflict. More insidiously, they can mask human ri abuses, given their reliance on self-reporting and lack of third-p verification (NSI, 2012) .
This does raise the question of the prospect for the effective of other voluntary extractive industry initiatives such as the In tive for Responsible Mining Assurance (IRMA) and the Alumin Stewardship Initiative (ASI) given that both will rely on reporting and a certain degree of third party verification thro audits. The shortcomings of similar initiatives in other sectors s as the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) and the est Stewardship Council have illustrated that a system predic entirely on the ability of its auditors to monitor company o ations is critically flawed (EIA, 2015) . In both initiatives audi firms have fundamentally failed to identify and mitigate un tainable practices, conducting substandard assessments. Overs of illegal practices is instead provided by the rigorous poli of communities and activists who must go through tedious c plaints procedures to achieve redress forcompany abuses. For th initiatives to be effective and uphold indigenous rights, com nies must be legally bound to their human rights obligation at present there are no clear obligations on corporations in rela to respecting human rights under international human rights apart from the weak formulation of the "responsibility to res human rights" in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Hu Rights (UNGP).
When indigenous peoples' have attempted to assert t human rights they have been met by threats and repression Guatemala, the arrival of ICMM member Goldcorp incited prot among the Mayan indigenous peoples which led to crimina tion and intimidation of members of the community (Coll Guatemala et al., 2009) . During the exploration phase of Marlin project Goldcorp, through its subsidiary Montana Ex radora de Guatemala, met with the indigenous communities of Miguel Ixtahuacán and Sipakapa in 2003 (Montana Explorad de Guatemala, 2004) . However, it did not carry out consu tions on the proposed mining project as it falsely claimed ( de Sandt, 2009), but used these meetings to pave the way smoothing land acquisitions, creating social division, and imposing a private land tenure system on communal territories (Imai et al., 2007) . This immediately triggered organized resistance in Sipakapa communities (Castagnino, 2006) , where they organized their own referendum, or consulta, on the issue. 11 of the 13 communities involved opposed the presence of mining activity in their region, however the consulta was denied its legitimacy by the State and the judiciary, a position Guatemala's Human Rights Ombudsman condemns given the State neither adequately informed nor initiated a dialogue with indigenous communities on the implementation of mega-projects on their territories (Van de Sandt, 2009) .
In the Philippines, ICMM member Xstrata (later merged with current ICMM member Glencore, who took over control of the project) bought a controlling interest in the Tampakan copper-gold project on the traditional lands of the indigenous B'laan people. The directly affected B'laan have consistently denied that they have given their FPIC to the project (Dinteg and Kaluhhamin, 2015) . The region of the project is already an area associated with internal armed conflict, but the B'laan's resistance rapidly led to further conflict, and the deployment of various army units, armed security and paramilitaries (notably an 'Investment Defence Force', which had the stated aim of protecting the company). Support groups quote a figure of ten project related extra-judicial killings associated with the mine since 2001, including the murder of indigenous leader Juvy Capion, with her two sons in 2012 (Kalikasan PNE, 2015) Militarization of indigenous territories, and the consequent serious human rights violations (Franciscans International, 2014) have resulted in a systematic narrowing of the space available for indigenous peoples' political participation and have eliminated any possibility for justice and accountability.
ICMM's inclusion of guidance on FPIC in their 2015Good Practice Guide provided a crucial step towards safeguarding indigenous peoples' rights from the abuses already described. Nevertheless, the industry's articulation of what happens if consent is not forthcoming -where ICMM members may rely on the "good faith" of the State to judge whether a project may proceed -risks allowing members to pursue projects in the absence of FPIC, putting them in a position where they are potentially complicit in State violations of indigenous peoples' rights. This shortcoming must be addressed if ICMM is to champion rights based engagement with indigenous peoples and ensure that gross violations of these rights do not occur. The challenge facing the industry therefore, is to go beyond State based initiatives aimed at consultation which fail to live up to international standards, and to ensure that consultations and respect for indigenous peoples' land, territory and resource, cultural and self-governance rights are consistent with international standards.
Larger companies tend to believe exploration activities are underneath the radar screen of reporting, and that they do not need to report on their joint venture activities where they are not the operator. It is paramount therefore that ICMM members when considering a joint venture with a smaller company (junior) or acquiring concessions from juniors undertake the necessary due diligence to ascertain whether interactions with indigenous peoples have been managed appropriately in accordance with good practice (ICMM, 2010) and if they are found to have violated this to report them. In such contexts, due diligence is necessary to ensure that there have been no prior human rights violations and to put in place whatever remedial processes are necessary to ensure that human rights are respected. In cases where the wrong cannot be remedied, or where consent has been withheld, respect for indigenous peoples' rights would require that ICMM members do not proceed to acquire such concessions.
In most situations where juniors are involved, there is little or no effort to obtain FPIC with indigenous peoples' rights being frequently violated in the process of obtaining access to their lands. It is in the interests of the industry to eliminate these rogue actors, improving the sector's reputation and reducing legacy issue this phase of the project due to poorly implemented FPIC pr (Collins, 2016) . In the words of the UN Global Compact, "o ing FPIC in a 'check-in-the-box manner is not sufficient to that the company respects the rights of indigenous peoples 2014). Furthermore, it is the opinion of the authors that st state regulation of juniors -who are numerous, tend to risk averse and have an associated lack of transparency -is tial. It is juniors who commonly undertake the exploration s the mining cycle and who are the first to engage with indi peoples.
Free, Prior and Informed Consent
FPIC is one of the most important principles that indi peoples have used to protect their rights. It is derived from nous peoples rights to lands, territories and resources, an cultural rights and self-governance rights, including the r self-determination. The duty of State and companies to indigenous peoples' FPIC guarantees community driven co tions and decision-making processes and ensures that indi peoples' can effectively determine the outcome of decision-m that affects them, not merely be involved in the process. Th versation around FPIC therefore must go hand in hand w conversation around recognizing and respecting these rig otherwise it occurs in a vacuum with no benefit to indi peoples'.
FPIC has its origins in the principle of native title from co law, i.e. that native people have rights to their lands based o customary law and sustained connections with the land. A they do not require any act of the State in order to asser rights. The principle of inherent rights over lands which peoples held prior to the arrival of colonizers was affirmed Spanish conquistadores. Denying the application of terra n to the Americas, de Vitoria, concluded "the aborigines in tion were true owners, before the Spaniards came among both from the public and private point of view" (Vitoria, In practice this right has been denied since the days of to the present day in nation states. This form of discrimina now challenged by the more recent recognition of customa tenure under human rights law, which has offered to revive nous peoples' sovereignty over their land. International rights law and jurisprudence affirms that indigenous peopl tomary land rights are not dependent on any 'grant' by the state, but are pre-existing and inherent rights grounded in tional occupation and use of the land.
The landmark judgement of the Inter American Court of Rights (IACHR) in Saramaka People v Suriname highlighted would be 'meaningless' to recognize land rights for indi peoples without recognizing their rights over natural res (Saramaka People v. Suriname, 2007) . This mirrors the ra adopted in the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indi Peoples (UNDRIP), the clearest articulation of indigenous p rights which affirms the State duty to consult with indi peoples before adopting measures that may affect them and the approval of any project affecting their lands and other res (UN General Assembly, 2007).
The requirement to seek and obtain indigenous peoples' FPIC is either explicitly affirmed, or clearly implied, in a range of other international instruments and standards, 3 being a derivate of their rights to self-determination, non-discrimination, culture and property. Notable examples being The Convention on Biological Diversity, an instrument that promotes the application of FPIC that has been signed and ratified by 157 countries (Convention on Biological Diversity, 2017), and International Labour Organization Convention 169 (ILO 169) which instructs the relevant state entity to identify the indigenous peoples to be consulted on the basis of the content of the proposed measure, the degree of the relationship between the measure and the indigenous peoples and the measure's territorial scope. Although ILO 169 4 has not been ratified by every country, the principles of consultation and participation that underpin the Convention are fundamental to the implementation of FPIC.
The presence of FPIC within national legislation is a crucial indicator of the extent towhich the State recognizes indigenous peoples rights within its jurisdiction. UN CERD's General Recommendation XXIII calls upon States to ensure that indigenous peoples' informed consent is attained before making decisions that directly affect indigenous peoples' rights and interests (UN Committee Elimination Racial Discrimination, 1997). Since the incorporation of ILO169 and UNDRIP into the international human rights discourse several countries have allowed for stronger State recognition of indigenous peoples' land, territory and resource rights these include Liberia (The Community Rights Law, Liberia, 2009) The trend is most pronounced in Latin America, where indigenous peoples are attaining significant recognition of customary access and formal rights to natural resources through the national courts. Several countries have passed laws or have jurisprudence that reference indigenous peoples right to FPIC. For example, the Constitution of Venezuela contains a provision requiring that native communities be consulted and provided with information prior to State exploitation of natural habitats (Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Venezuela, 1999) . Judicial rulings have clarified the requirement for FPIC should be assumed to apply in thecontext of large-scale extractive projects. The Constitutional Court of Colombia, for example, has issued numerous rulings ordering the suspension of development projects, or declaring legislation unconstitutional because of alack of priorconsultation with indigenous peoples (DPLF, 2011) . In one instance, it held that "the information or notification that is given to the indigenous community in connection with a project of exploration or exploitation of natural resources does not have the same value as consultation. It is necessary. . .that community declares, through their authorized representatives their consent" (Constitutional Court of Colombia, 1997) .
The Canadian Supreme Court in Delgamuukw v British Columbia (Delgamuukw v British Columbia, 1997) held that the duty of the State to consult with indigenous peoples is proportionate to the expected impacts on traditional lands and resources. In the case of minor impact, a duty to discuss important decisions pertains while full consent pertains for serious issues and impacts. H Nation v British Colombia upheld the Government's duty of sultation and accommodation prior to title being proven (H Nation v. British Columbia, 2004) , echoing Taku River Tlingit Nation v British Columbia where it was judged the States dut consult prior to approving the re-opening of a mine and the struction of anaccess road through the territoryover which the Nation claimed (Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British Colum 2004) . Sadly, these decisions, despite challenging the notion the Statehad a monopoly on the exercise of law, have not caused practice of government agencies and corporate interests to cha in response to their duty to consult indigenous peoples on proj that impact them.
Even in States which have taken legislative measures to fil promises of constitutional recognition of indigenous peo ancestral land rights, such as the Philippines in its 1997 Indigen Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), problems with the extractive indust have arisen. IPRA explicitly requires FPIC for significant de opment projects, like mining, in indigenous territories. Howe in 2006, the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NC the government agency responsible for protecting and prom ing indigenous peoples' rights, revised its FPIC guidelines ma it increasingly difficult for indigenous communities to implem their own visions of FPIC. Since then there have been signifi problems in IPRA's implementation due in part to its inhe lack of representation of and accountability to indigenous peo Numerous violations have resulted in its poor applicationverting the process for acquiring FPIC (Magno and Gatmay 2013) , recognizing false indigenous leaders to further the cla of mining companies (Castillo Llaneta, 2012a) and implemen a defective, cumbersome and expensive process for securing tificates of ancestral domain title and land title (Castillo Llan 2012b) . This has all been undermined by the poorly funded N which was transformed by more powerful actors into a facilitato corporate access to indigenous peoples' lands, rather than an in tution which facilitated indigenous people to exercise their righ self-determination (Doyle, 2015b) . The NCIP has since promulg revised guidelines on FPIC (Republic of the Philippines, 2012) way to address implementation challenges. The 2012 guidel stipulate that indigenous peoples have the right to develop a olution of consent or crucially a resolution of non-consent. T also provide for multiple application of FPIC throughout the of a project, denote excluded areas (including sacred grounds burial sites) and require the participation of indigenous leader the field research team (Magno and Gatmaytan, 2013) . Effec implementation of the new progressive rules will be critical if Philippine government is to achieve real community participa in the natural resources decision-making and genuine protec of indigenous peoples' rights.
While the obligations incumbent on States have tradit ally been the focus of international human rights law, ther strong arguments in contemporary law that obligations to res human rights can apply to non-state actors including mult tional corporations. 5 The unanimous endorsement of the U in 2011 called on corporations to respect human rights, independently of the State compliance with its duty to protect those rights, and to operate to internationally recognized human rights standards (Voss and Greenspan, 2012) . This requires the identification of indigenous peoples and any potential impacts on their rights prior to decision-making in relation to plans or activities potentially impacting them (UN General Assembly, 2011). The responsibility includes the requirement to consult with indigenous peoples in order to obtain their FPIC (UN General Assembly, 2011). These processes must be implemented at the earliest possible stage of a project, prior to the issuance of licences or concessions and certainly before the commencement of any mining activity.
Ultimately, FPIC provides the platform that is necessary for constructive engagements with indigenous peoples in a manner consistent with the corporate responsibility to respect human rights (United Nations, 2007) . In doing so, it also offers the only practical long-term approach to the pursuit of extractive projects in or near indigenous peoples' territories. Therefore, to guarantee the extractive sector lives up to its human rights responsibilities, in particular respect for indigenous peoples' rights, recognition of the standard is absolutely critical.
One of the major outstanding challenges with the FPIC standard, remains its enforcement and compliance. Evaluations of FPIC processes indicate the difficulties involved in actual implementation, especially in the absence of consensus among indigenous peoples' (where some may favour cooperation with a company while others oppose). Similarly, challenges due to complex layers of legislation, unsettled land-tenure, low government capacity, lack of existing institution infrastructures and transparency regarding compensation make verification of compliance with the FPIC principles tough to determine (Christoffersen, 2015) . A concern is that companies and States alike are turning FPIC into a formality no longer based on customary laws, by manipulating processes and certifications without due verification of procedure in the community. This could lead to FPIC being reduced "from constructive collaborative decisionmaking to a reaction to externally defined projects or to a single event with no longer-term engagement" (Feiring, 2013) .
Initiative for Responsible Mining Assurance
The most promising of extractive industry multi-stakeholder initiatives involving indigenous peoples is IRMA (IRMA, 2016) . The aim of IRMA is to establish a multi-stakeholder and independently verified Responsible Mining Assurance system that improves social and environmental performance. IRMA isnot the most recent ofinitiatives, having been founded in 2006. Unlike the MMSD and ICMM, the development of the IRMA standard is much more of a multistakeholder process, involving players such as mineral buyersparticularly jewellers -who were seeking ways to certify their supply chains. Learning from previous failures, there was an attempt to build up trust among a small number of key players, allowing time to truly address even the more problematic issues, such as FPIC. Crucially, IRMA early on recognized the importance for indigenous peoples (and local communities) to be directly represented as a key stakeholder in negotiations, and not just be added as a subgroup of non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
Both potentially important institutional mechanism through whi can seek to pressure the extractive sector to respect their rial rights. IRMA plans to beta test its certification system in with independent auditing. There have been concerns rais IRMA is such a relatively high standard that it may not be a ble widely across the industry, but creating shared high sta and then independently verifying if companies can achiev seems to be the way forward.
Aluminium Stewardship Initiative
The flaws of MMSD and ICMM have allowed initiatives IRMA and ASI to rise toprominence in response togrowing pr from stakeholders in the mining supply chain to assure th tection of indigenous peoples' rights. Historically, the prod of aluminium in particular -involving bauxite mining and scale dams supplying cheap power for smelting and refinin had significant direct adverse effects on indigenous commu A case in point is the experience of Adivasi indigenous peo India, where Vedanta Resources' attempts to exploit the fourth largest bauxite deposit in the sacred Niyamgiri mou located in the heart of the Kond tribal area -was the subject o national condemnation (Doyle et al., 2015) . Investigations i by the UK Government's National Contact Point found the co had made no significant attempts 'to put in place an adequa timely consultation mechanism' (London Mining Network or seek Dongria Kond community consent (Amnesty Interna 2012) despite falsely claiming otherwise (London Mining Ne 2012).
Just as local stakeholder resistance culminated in a suc Indian Supreme Court ruling in favour of the Kond comm pressure from the international community led to a fair an structive discussion between the aluminium industry an society. The results of both have been extremely positive; th gria Kond when given the opportunity to decide whethe wanted bauxite mining on their ancestral land unsurprisingly unanimously against the project (Doyle et al., 2015) . T despite continued intimidation and ongoing plans for minin vote has been respected. ASI, grew out of years of collaborati input from a global group of stakeholders in the aluminium chain, civil society, research and policy organizations (Alum Stewardship Council, 2017a) . The international multi-stake approach resulted in the launch of the ASI Performance Stan 2014 which crucially recognized indigenous peoples' right or withhold their FPIC (Aluminium Stewardship Council, 20 The development of the ASI standard is clearly a step in th direction, it has set an exciting new precedent for other sec the extractive industry to follow. Multi-stakeholder-dialog system of checks and balances, and transparent decision-m help both the private and public sectors to overcome their re tions and foster a stronger relationship between the mining and indigenous peoples. This is not to say they are withou challenges, evidence from the RSPO and FSC demonstrate th tematic weaknesses exist over the efficacy of the monitoring where responsibility is delegated to auditing firms that are mentally failing to identify and mitigate illegal practices. Fo initiatives to be effective and uphold indigenous rights, c nies must be legally bound to their human rights obligat at present there are no clear obligations on corporations in r to respecting human rights under international human righ apart from the weak formulation of the "responsibility to human rights" in the UNGP. Furthermore, the tensions be these voluntary standards adopted by industry and compan gations to comply with national laws may create contra pressures in the future.
This said, one of the core strengths of ASI is in the way it has involved indigenous peoples. Since 2015 it has established an Indigenous Peoples Advisory Forum whose principle aim is to support indigenous engagement with the ASI (Aluminium Stewardship Council, 2017b), guiding their input through their chosen organizations. ASI represents a new type of involvement for affected communities -one of collaboration rather than subjugation. Thus, the ASI standard is taking an important stand towards fulfilling its role as a safeguard for indigenous peoples' rights across the entire aluminium value chain. By requiring companies to commit to respect and implement, FPIC. ASI has built solid foundations for a comprehensive third-party certification system, one which respects fundamental freedoms. These foundations will face their true test when the certification comes into effect later this year.
Conclusions
International human rights law and business good practice recognize that extractive projects should not be established on indigenous peoples' lands without recognition and respect of their prior rights to the land, and of their right to control what happens on that land -especially in States where weak national frameworks provide little protections for customary tenure rights. FPIC is the core international standard that allows these rights to be realized if the safeguard is properly applied in good faith and fully in line with its core principles.
In light of this it is deeply concerning that some States continue to oppose and undermine the FPIC human rights standard. At the time of its endorsement of the UN Declaration in 2010, the United States indicated that FPIC calls for "a process of meaningful consultation with tribal leaders, but not necessarily. . .agreement" (US Department of State, 2010) . The following year, at the Commission on Sustainable Development's Working Group on Mining, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United States asked for the deletion ofFPIC from text regarding indigenous and local communities. Similar concerns have been raised regarding the interpretation of FPIC, where a number of financial institutions -including the World Bank -have pushed for the concept of consultation over consent. Replacing the established standard with the lesser standard of consultation would mean at the conclusion of such a process governments and corporations could act in their own interests, while unilaterally and arbitrarily ignoring the will of indigenous peoples.
Moreover, recognition and enjoyment of the right are two quite different things. The gap between what is clearly established in good practice to be a requirement of international law and actual practice is still very wide. The common thread from the examples presented has been the inadequacy of corporate respect for indigenous peoples' rights under international law. In contrast when companies implement due FPIC processes in good faith and in an effective and credible manner, they can benefit from improved understanding of communities, which should translate into better partnerships in the long term should the FPIC process result in some form of agreement. In the same way, if no such agreement is reached the company is duty bound to respect the community decision and refrain from further engagement seeking consent or pressing sections of the community to reverse or revisit the decision.
An increasing number of indigenous communities are becoming empowered to assert their rights and there is widespread expectation that companies will respect those rights and obtain their FPIC. The corresponding risks associated with the failure to obtain FPIC, and the associated lack of social licence to operate, are evident. Numerous large-scale extractive projects have been halted or delayed for extended periods due to indigenous protests (Lehr and Smith, 2010) , and indigenous advocacy is leading to challenges to the legality of concessions and their potential revocation (V and Greenspan, 2012) . The World Resources Institute publish report in 2007 that makes a business case for FPIC, arguing extractive companies incur greater long-term costs if they ope without the consent of affected communities (Herz et al., 20 Newmont's experience in Cajamarca is a notable example, w indigenous protests to the development of the massive Mina Co project bought operations to a halt. The mining giant claims th lost approximately $2 million per day in the first few days of l protests (International Business Times, 2012) . The project rem paralyzed to date. The message is clear. The extractive indu must toe the line on human rights and pursue due FPIC proce or face increasing difficulties in dealing with both the local and international community.
